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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick* and Brad Eric Scheler**

A Flexible Standard for Shielding
. Thrdily Perfected Security
Interests from Preference Attack
Equality of treatment of similarly
situated creditors is a basic policy
underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
Consistent with that policy, the Code
gives the trustee or debtor in posses'sion the power to avoid certain preferential transfers made to creditors
shortly before a debtor's bankruptcy.
In particular, if within the statutory
preference period before the commencement of a bankruptcy case, the
debtor while insolvent transferred an
interest in property to a creditor oil
account of an_ antecedent debt, the
Code permits the avoidance of the
transfer if it enables the creditor to
receive more than it would receive
in a liquidation case had the transfer
not been made.' The creditor is thus
deprived of the. unfair advantage it
* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School ofLaw, Hempstead, N.Y.; Of
counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.
**Chairman of the Bankruptcy andRestructuring Department of the firm of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New
York, N.Y.
1
See 11 U.S.C. § 547. The statutory preference period is 90 days before the commencement of the bankruptcy case, or one
year before bankruptcy if the creditor was
an insider at the time of the transfer. 11
u.s.c. § 547(b)(4).

would have obtained from the
prebankruptcy transfer.
In order to know whether a transfer constitutes an avoidable preference, it is necessary to determine the
time of the transfer for two reasons.
First, only transfers occurring
within 90 days-or within one year
if the transfer benefits an insider
creditor-before the bankruptcy
case commences may be avoided as
preferences. Second, the time of the
transfer will determine whether it
was on account of an antecedent
debt. Section 547(e) of the Code
provides that, for preference purposes, a transfer occurs at the time
it first becomes effective between ('
the transferor and the transferee,
but only if it is perfected within
ten days after that time. 2 If perfection occurs after the ten-day
period, the transfer is deemed to
occur at the time of perfection.

2 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2). In general, a
transfer of a,n interest in real estate, other
than fixtures, is "perfected" when a bona
fide purchaser of the property could not
acquire an interest that is superior to the
interest of the transferee. A conveyance of
a: fee interest in land, or of a real estate mortgage, is perfected when the deed or mortgage is recorded. A transfer of personal
property or a fixture is "perfected" when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest
of the transferee. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(l).
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For example, suppose that a creditor gave the debtor a loan on March
1 and, on that date, the parties executed a security agreement that
granted the creditor a security interest in the debtor's equipment. Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the security interest attached and became effective
between the debtor and the creditor
on March 1. Assume further that a
financing statement was filed on
March 18 to perfect the security interest. The debtor was insolvent during that time period and, on June 6,
the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. Because the security interest in
the equipment was perfected more
than ten days after the security interest attached, the transfer of the
security interest is deemed to have
been made for preference purposes
on March 18, which was within 90
days of bankruptcy. In addition, the
transfer was on account of an antecedent debt because the debt was incurred on March 1 and the transfer
was made for preference purposes
on March 18. Therefore, the delayed
perfection renders the security interest vulnerable to attack as a voidable
preference. On the other hand, if
perfection had occurred on March 9,
the transfer would be deemed to
have been made on March 1 and,
accordingly, it would not have occurred within the 90-day preference
period and also would not have been
a transfer for an antecedent debt.
Despite the presence of all the elements of a voidable preference
under Section 547(b) of the Code,
several exceptions found in Sec-

tion 547(c) will shield certain
prebankruptcy transfers from a
preference attack. One exception,
often referred to as the enabling loan
exception, is designed to lengthen
the 10-day grace period when perfecting a purchase money security
interest. Under Section 547(c)(3), an
otherwise preferential security interest is nqt avoidable if it is a purchase
money security interest that is perfected within 20 gays after the debtor
receives possession of the collateraJ.3 For example, if the security
interest in the above hypothetical
was given to obtain the funds used
to purchase the collateral, and the
debtor obtained possession of the
collateral on March 15, the security
interest would not be subject to preference attack because of the enabling
loan exception under Section
547(c)(3).

Contemporaneous Exchange for
New Value

Another provision of the Code,
Section 547(c)(l), shields from preference attack a transfer that. was intended by the parties to be, and was
in fact, a substantially contemporaneous exchange for new value given
to the debtor. 4 As discussed above,
a transfer of a security interest takes
place at the time of perfection if it is
not perfected within ten days after
3
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) for greater
detail regarding the requirements for this
exception. Before Section § 547(c)(3) was
amended in 1994, the applicable period was
ten days after the debtor received possession of the collateral.
4
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l).
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the security interest attaches. An issue that courts have had to face is
whether a security interest that is
perfected more than ten days after
its attachment, thereby constituting
a transfer on account of an antecedent debt, could be a contemporaneous exchange for new value
protected under Section 547(c)(l).
A recent district court decision that
illustrates a trend in resolving this
question is In re Stephens, s where a
debtor granted a bank a security interest in connection ·with refinancing an automobile loan. The debtors,
a husband and wife,~owned a 1991
Ford Bronco that was purchased
with the proceeds of a loan from
Ford Motor Credit Corp. (FMCC).
FMCC held a security interest in the
Ford Bronco that was p~rfected by
notation of the lien on the certificate
of title in accordance with state law.
In 1997, the debtors sought to refinance the FMCC loan to obtain a
lower interest rate. For that purpose,
they executed a credit application
form and submitted it to Chisolm
Trail State Bank ("the Bank") on
July 21, 1997. On the same day, the
debtors executed and delivered to the
Bank a secured promissory note
wherein they pledged the vehicle to
the Bank, and an "Application for
Secured, Duplicate, Reissue Title"
form listing the Bank as a lienholder.
The debtors also delivered the original certificate of title to ~he Bank.
Also on July 21, the Bank issued a
cashier's check payable to FMCC
and containing a notation that it was
'242 B.R. 508 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1999);
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a payoff of the debtors' FMCC account. The cashier's check was immediately mailed to FMCC, which
deposited it on July 23 and released
its lien on the lienholder's copy of
the title and registration application.
Upon receipt of FMCC's copy of
the title and registration application,
the Bank forwarded it together with
the original certificate of title and the
applicable fee to the appropriate
state agency. The date of the title and
registration application was August
4th. The state issued the new title to
the vehicle-showing the debtors as
owners and the Bank as lienholderon September 2, 1997.
The debtors filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 24, 1997.
The trustee commenc;ed an action
seeking to avoid the Bank's se~urity
interest in the Ford Bronco as a preference under Section 547(b). The
parties stipulated that the debtors and
the Bank intended the loan and the
granting of the security interest in
the vehicle to occur at the same time.
They also stipulated that unsecured
creditors will be paid less than 100
percent of their claims in the bankruptcy case. Accordingly, unless
avoided, the granting of the security
interest would enable the Bank to
receive more than it would otherwise
receive as an unsecured creditor in
the Chapter 7 case.
The Trustee's Argument
The trustee contended that the security interest may be avoided as a
preference because it was a transfer
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a

5

242 B.R. 508 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1999).
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preference because it was a transfer
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on account of an antecedent debt
made within 90 days of bankruptcy ·
while the debtors were insolvent. He>:·'
reasoned that the security interest
became effective between the debtors and the Bank on July 21, but it
was not perfected until August 4.
Because perfection occurred more
than 10 days after the July 21 effective date, under Section 547(e)(2),
the date of the transfer for preference
purposes was August 4. Of course,
the debt was incurred on July 21,
thereby rendering the granting of the
se<;:urity interest a transfer on apcount of an antecedent debt.
The Bank did not dispute the contention that the grant of the security
interest was a transfer that met all
the elements of an avoidable preference under Section 547(b). The
Bank took the position, however;
that the security interest was protected from preference attack under
Section 547(c)(l) because it was a
substantially contemporaneous exchange for new value. The trustee
countered that the "substantially
contemporaneous exchange" exception does not apply to a security interest perfected more than ten days
after attachment-a position that is
supported by case law. 6
The Bank responded that the tenday provision found in Section
547(e)(2) "does not delineate the
boundaries" of a "substantially conThe district court cited In re Arnett, 731
F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1984), and its progeny as
authority supporting the trustee's position
that the security interest was not a "substantially contemporaneous" exchange because
it was petfected more.than ten days after it
attached.

temporaneous exchange" under Section 547(c). 7 It argued that the use
of the term "substantially contemporaneous," rather than a specific
time limit "shows that Congress intended to adopt a flexible standard
requiring an analysis of all the facts
surrounding the transfer." 8 As the
district court noted, the Bank's position also was supported by existing case law.!! The Bank was
successful in persuading the bankruptcy court that the ten-day provision in Section 547(e)(2) does QOt
preclude a finding thai the transfer
and the loan were substantially contemporaneous.
District Court Affirms
On appeal, the district court acknowledged that both the trustee's
view and the Bank's view on the applicability of the substantially contemporaneous exchange exception
to a security interest perfected more
than 10 days after attachment "can
claim some support from the text and
structure of §547." 10 The trustee's
view is supported by the language
of Section 547(e)(2), which determines when a transfer is made "for
purposes of this section,'' 11 which
includes the subsection on substantially contemporaneous exchanges
for ne'V value. Moreover, the district
7

6

242 B.R. at 510.

• 8Jd.
9 The· district court cited Pine Top Ins.
Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l. Sav. Ass'n, 969
F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1992), and its progeny.
10
242 B.R•. at 510.
11 11 U.S.C.-§ 547(e)(2).
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court cited authority for the position
that the time limit in Section
547(c)(3) regarding purchase money
security interests precludes application of the substantially contemporaneous exchange exception. 12 For
these reasons, the district court
found that the trustee's argument
"has some logical force." 13 However, the district court also noted that
the Bank's view-that a grant of a
security interest could qualify as a
substantially contemporaneous exchange for a loan notwithstanding
the fact that it was not perfected
within 10 days after attachment-is
"bolstered b)' Congress' use of a subjective (and somewhat vague) standard in subsection (c)(1) instead of
an objective and specific time limit,
such as appears. frequently in other
provisions of the Code. " 14
Flexible Standard Adopted

On balance, the district court concluded that the approach taken by the
bankruptcy court-which adopted
the Bank's view that the substantially contemporaneous provision in
Section 547(c)(l) could apply even
if perfection takes place after the
crucial10-day period-is the better
approach. The district court referred
to the decision of the Eighth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re
Dorholt, 15 where the panel noted
that Congress' use of the phrase
12
The court cited In re Tressler, 771 F.2d
791 (3rd Cir. 1985).
13
242 B.R. at 510.
14 Id.
1
' 239 B.R. 521 (8th Cir. BAP 1999).
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"substantially contemporaneous"
indicated that a flexible standard was
intended instead of a specific time
limit. 16 The. district court in Stephens
noted that "contemporaneous" is
defined in Webster~ Dictionary to
mean "exi_sting or occurring during
the same time (as during a year, decade, or longer span of time)" or
"originating, arising, or being
formed or made at the same time;
marked by characteristics compatible
with such origin." 17 The flexible standard requires the court to examine the
length of the delay, as well as the reason for the delay, nature of the transaction, intent of the parties, and the
possible risk of fraud. 18
The district court then addressed
possible concerns that saving security.interests not perfected within 10
days after attachment from preference attack would inevitably le~d t_o
the protection of secret liens.
"Any concern over the possible creation of secret liens by a creditor
'should ... be allayed by a court's examination and consideration of the
reasonableness of a delay in perfection. Where there is a reasonable and
plausible explanation for the delay,
there should be no concern that a
creditor was recording a secret lien
in anticipation of bankruptcy." 19
16
17

242 B.R. at 511.
242 B.R. at 511 n.2 (citing Webster:V

Third New Int'l. Dictionary (1961)).
18
See In re Dorltolt, Inc., 239 B.R. at 525.
19 242 B.R. ·at 511 (quoting from in re
Dorltolt, 239 B.R. at 525, which cited In re
Marino, 193 B.R. 907, 915 (9th Cir. BAP
1996,aff'd, 117F.3d 1425(9thCir.1997)).
The district court in Stephens also cited In
re Carson, 119 B.R. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1990), where the court held that perfection
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Application of the Flexible
Standard to the Facts
Applying the substantially contemporaneous exchange exception
to the facts, the district court emphasized that the delay between the loan
transaction and perfection of the security interest was only 14 days and
was caused by reasons that were not
within the Bank's control. The Bank
promptly sent its check to FMCC to
pay off the existing lien, and then
forwarded tile registration documents noting the Bank's lien to the
Department of Motor Vehicles a
soon as the Bank received from
FMCC the required documentation
releasing its lien. The bankruptcy
court found that the delay was not
unreasonable and that in these particular circumstances the transfer of
the security interest was substantially contemporaneous with the
loan. The district court, holding that
the issue of whether the transfer and
the loan were substantially contemporaneous is a question of fact and
that the bankruptcy court's findings
on that issue were not clearly erroneous, affirmed the judgment in favor of the Bank.
Conclusion

ous exchange exception in Section
547(c)(l) was not applicable where
a security interest was perfected
more than 10 days after the loan was
given and the security interest attached. These transff!rS were often
voided as preferences. 20 More recently, however, there have been a
number of decisions similar to that
in In re Stephens in which courts
have taken a more flexible approach,
applying Section 547(c)(l) to save
otherwise preferential transfers
where perfection was delayed for
more than ten days. 21 As a Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
wrote a few years ago:
"[W]e find that a flexible standard
best comports with the policies of
§ 547, and adopt it with respect to the
requirement of §547(c)(l)(B) that a
transfer ~,e substantially contemporaneous m fact. Instead of applying
the strict ten-day limit enumerated
in§ 547(e)(2), an inquiry into the
facts and circumstances of the
particular transaction should be
made to determine whether a
transfer was substantially contemporaneous in fact." 22

Despite the trend to a more relaxed
standard, secured lenders and their
lawyers should not assume that they
will be protected by a case by case
determination regarding the provisions of Section 547(c)(~) and (e),

Within the first decade after the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code,
most courts faced with the issue held
that the substantially contemporane-

Cir. 1984).

of a security interest in the debtor's vehicle
14 days after the loan and the signing of the
security agreement was a substantially contemporaneous exchange for new value under Section 547(c)(l)).

21
See, e.g., In re Marino, 193 B.R. 907
(9th Cir. BAP 1996), aff'd. 117 F.3d 1425
(9th Cir 1997); Pine Top Ins. Co. v. Bank of
Am. Nat'!. Sav. Ass'n., 969 F.2d 321 (7th
Cir. 1992).
.
22 Marino, 193 ,B.R. at 915-916.

20
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and should always attempt to perfect
security interests as soon as possible.
If perfection occurs within ten days
after the loan transaction and attachment of the lien, litigation on

[VOL. 33 : 108 2000]

whether grantin~ the security interest was a substantially contemporaneous exchange for the loan may be
avoided entirely in a subsequent
bankruptcy case.
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